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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, both major presidential candidates supported a big 
increase in federal spending for infrastructure improvements.1 This is a 
good thing in light of the state of America’s infrastructure.2 Given that 
much of the nation’s infrastructure is owned and maintained by local 
governments, such proposals require local governments to access the capital 
markets even more than they currently do. And, as it is, the municipal 
market is extremely large. In 2015 alone, there were 6,530 “new money” 
municipal bond issues, totaling nearly $153.86 billion.3 
Looking forward, there is therefore good reason to pause and think 
about how local governments might access the capital markets more 
efficiently. Looking backward, however, the Great Recession also provides 
another reason to think about local governments and the capital markets, as 
it revealed that local governments had not been issuing debt wisely. 
                                                 
 *  Lori Raineri is the president of Government Financial Strategies. Darien Shanske 
is a professor of law and political science at UC Davis. The authors wish to thank Bob 
Hillman, Amie Kaewsriprach, Matthew Kolker and all of the participants in the Belmont 
Law Review Symposium on The Modern Metropolis. 
 1. Conor Dougherty, Candidates in a Rare Accord, On Updating Infrastructure, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. THE BOND BUYER, 2015 IN STATISTICS 3A (2015), available at 
http://cdn.bondbuyer.com/pdfs/2015-in-statistics.pdf. 
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For example, in the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, 
numerous public entities borrowed for infrastructure projects using a 
borrowing structure known as auction rate securities (“ARS”).4 By 
February 2008, the total dollar amount of ARS outstanding was estimated 
to be about $267 billion.5 To give a bit more context, the total municipal 
market had $3.653 trillion outstanding in 2008.6 Thus, ARS represented a 
substantial part of the market. In many ways, using ARS is analogous to 
borrowing for a house using an adjustable rate mortgage (“ARM”). The 
interest rates on ARS were lower than the rates for conventional borrowings 
and, thus, public entities saved billions of dollars.7 
Then the crisis of 2008 hit and the entities that used ARS, much 
like the many individuals who used ARMs, found themselves in trouble, 
costing governments millions—possibly billions—of dollars.8 These losses 
came from governments (1) having to pay higher interest rates than 
expected within these transactions, (2) having to pay to get out of these (or 
related) transactions, and (3) having to pay to re-finance the debt using a 
more conventional structure at a less than opportune time.9 Since 2008, no 
ARS have been issued and only a tiny amount of ARS, approximately 
twenty billion dollars, remain outstanding.10  
So, the once flourishing ARS market is no more. What should 
policymakers conclude about this? 
One plausible, if Panglossian, analysis is that there is little to learn. 
Government is obligated to uphold the public trust, and lowering borrowing 
costs is consistent with this duty. This government duty justifies using 
ARS. Whether the ARS market had design flaws that always doomed it or 
only a crisis as severe as the Great Recession could have destroyed it, local 
                                                 
 4. D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RES. SERV., AUCTION RATE SECURITIES 2 (2012), 
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34672.pdf. 
 5. Baixiao Liu et al., Why Did Auction Rate Bond Auctions Fail during 2008-2009?, 
25 J. FIXED INCOME 1, 5 (Fall 2015), available at 
http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/mcconnell/publications/PublicationsPDFS/Why . . . 
2008%20JFI%20Fall%202010%20V20%20N2%205-18.pdf. 
 6. US Bond Market Issuance and Outstanding, SIFMA.ORG, 
http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2016). 
 7. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 1. 
 8. See, e.g., Michael McDonald, Auction Supply ‘Tsunami’ Portends Municipal 
Losses, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 3, 2008). It should be noted that a certain amount of this money 
was recovered from the banks that facilitated these transactions. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N., REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 9-10 (July 31, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf. That the action of the 
financial intermediaries was so outrageous that it resulted in large financial settlements does 
not seem comforting to us. 
 9. McDonald, supra note 8, at 2. 
 10. Liu et al., supra note 5, at 4-5; US Municipal Bond Credit Report, Fourth Quarter 
and Full Year 2015, SIFMA.ORG, http://www.sifma.org/research/item.aspx?id=8589958953 
(follow the hyperlink under “US Municipal Bond Credit Report Fourth Quarter and Full 
Year 2015”). 
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governments are supposed to be laboratories of innovation, and sometimes 
experiments fail. 
We think the dominant analysis is more circumspect. The financial 
crisis of 2008 made clear that government officials did not always 
understand the implications of the financial instruments that they used.11 
There will be other fiscal shocks, especially throughout the long terms over 
which much borrowing occurs. Accordingly, government officials’ current 
level of knowledge is inadequate and should be corrected, especially as to 
more complex financial instruments. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession, federal law has changed, largely through the Dodd-Frank Act, to 
compel financial intermediaries to provide more information to government 
issuers and to take the best interests of the government issuers into 
account.12 
In this Article, we will argue for yet a third analysis. Not every 
problem is amenable to resolution through additional education or 
disclosure. We will explain why the ARS debacle illustrates that there are 
certain kinds of borrowing structures that should be categorically 
prohibited. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Interest rates are the price a borrower pays for the use of someone 
else’s money. When we talk about the movements of interest rates, we often 
use U.S. Treasuries, the rate at which the United States borrows, as a 
benchmark.13 As the Great Recession began, there was not only a general 
and steep decline in short term interest rates, but also great volatility.14 It 
will be useful to keep this in mind as our story unfolds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 11. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & Carter Dougherty, From Midwest to M.T.A., Pain 
From Global Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008, at A1. 
 12. For the consensus on knowledge, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 8, at 
91-95; see id. at 96-98 (summary of some changes in federal law). 
 13. Michael J. Flemming, The Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market: Recent Performance 
and Possible Alternatives, 6 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (2000), 
available at 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/00v06n1/0004flem.pdf. 
 14. See 1-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, FEDERAL RESERVE ECONOMIC 
DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS1MO (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
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CHART 1: Interest Rates and the Great Recession (Grey shading 
indicates recession)15 
 
Typically, the longer the term over which someone wants to borrow 
money, the higher the interest rate. This is an observed “normal” economic 
condition, generally thought to reflect considerations of the yield on 
Treasury securities plus adjustments for risks related to inflation, default, 
liquidity, and maturity for the specific borrowing.16 A yield curve shows the 
yield of bonds by maturity and thereby reflects the term structure of interest 
rates. No person or institution dictates the yield curve. Rather, the yield 
curve results from supply and demand in the capital markets. When the 
interest rates go up as maturity terms are longer, the yield curve is normal, 
and when interest rates are higher for shorter terms than longer terms, the 
yield curve is described as inverted by economists and market participants. 
Thus, it is normal for short-term interest rates to be lower than long-term 
rates, and the slope of the yield curve tells us by how much. 
As shown below, the yield curve was frequently inverted during the 
crisis of 2008.17 Thus, for instance, in January of 2008, it was cheaper to 
borrow for three years than it was for three months. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
        15.   Id. 
 16. The five specific components of the yield curve are: (1) Risk-Free Rate, (2) 
Inflation Premium, (3) Default Risk Premium, (4) Liquidity Premium, and (5) Maturity Risk 
Premium. These components work together as a formula: rrf + IP + DRP + LP + MRP = 
Interest Rate. See generally EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & MICHAEL C. EHRHARDT, FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 177 (2008). 
 17. See Treasury Yield Curve, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/Historic-
Yield-Data-Visualization.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (in order to generate the data). 
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CHART 2: Yield Curves18 
 
Now, let’s begin a running example of a municipality wishing to 
undertake a large capital project, say, building a new tunnel to ease 
downtown congestion. Another rule of financial management is that the 
financing of an asset should roughly align with the useful life of the asset.19 
This is both fair and sensible. Let’s say the new tunnel will cost $100 
million. The alignment is fair because there is no reason why that entire 
cost should be borne by current residents of the city. The alignment is also 
sensible because if debt payments are not spread out, then big projects like 
this could hardly ever be built. It is likely that a major capital project is as 
large as the city’s entire operating budget. It would take a long time for a 
municipality to save that much money.20 Accordingly, pay-as-you-use (pay-
use or debt) financing has dominated pay-as-you-go (pay-go or cash) 
infrastructure financing for a very long time.21 
We will stipulate that the useful life of the tunnel is thirty years and 
that that is the period over which the borrowing for this tunnel should be 
repaid. The city is likely to get a good deal on its borrowing for several 
                                                 
        18.   Id. 
 19. See generally Role of the Finance Director in Capital Asset Management, GOV. 
FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, http://www.gfoa.org/role-finance-director-capital-asset-management 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
 20. Dwight Denison & Zihe Guo, Local Debt Management and Budget Stabilization in 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET STABILIZATION: EXPLORATIONS AND EVIDENCE 122 (Yilin Hou 
ed.). 
 21. See, e.g., Wen Wang & Yilin Hou, Pay-as-You-Go Financing and Capital Outlay 
Volatility: Evidence from the States over Two Recent Economic Cycles, 29 PUB. BUDGETING 
& FIN. 1, 92-96 (Winter 2009). 
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reasons. First, relative to most individuals and businesses, cities are usually 
fairly diverse economically. Second, definitely unlike individuals and 
businesses, cities generally have the power to raise taxes in order to raise 
revenue. Third, because of the governmental nature of cities, the interest on 
the bonds they will issue is likely exempt from federal and state income 
taxes. Thus, the resulting interest rate is likely lower than the borrowing 
rate for corporate issuers or even the U.S. government. 
 
CHART 3: Comparison of Long-Term Interest Rates (Grey shading 
indicates recession)22 
 
As this chart indicates, the borrowing rate for many localities has 
generally been competitive with the borrowing rates paid by the highest-
rated corporations and the United States itself.23 Still, this chart only 
compares long-term bond issues; that is, borrowings for over twenty years. 
Wouldn’t it be better to travel “down” the yield curve and borrow at the rate 
of borrowing for one year rather than thirty? Of course! 
There are two basic approaches. The first is to use a variable rate 
structure. This is much like using an ARM for financing one’s home. The 
basic idea is that the borrower is only locking in a rate for a short amount of 
time, say a year, but that rate is equal to the lower interest rate available for 
short-term borrowing. After the year is up, the borrower must borrow 
again24 and then again at the lower end of the yield curve. However, the key 
is that these interest rates are not fixed when the debt is issued but are 
readjusted at fixed dates. In several years, it is possible that short-term 
                                                 
 22. Moody’s Seasoned AAA Corporate Bond Yield, FEDERAL RESERVE ECONOMIC 
DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA (last visited Mar. 19 2017). 
 23. Id. 
 24. This is a little bit of an oversimplification. Technically, the bond-holders can force 
the issuer to take back the bonds (a put option, i.e., an option to sell). CALIFORNIA DEBT AND 
INVESTMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION (“CDIAC”), ISSUE BRIEF: AUCTION RATE SECURITIES 2 
(Aug. 2004). In order to make sure that there is money to repurchase the bonds, the issuers 
of variable rate bonds must also purchase a line of credit from a bank. This is expensive and 
is not a requirement for ARS. Id. 
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interest rates are higher than the current long-term interest rates. So, for 
instance, consider the following chart: 
 
CHART 4: Short-Term v. Long-Term Tax Exempt Interest Rates25 
 
 
The short-term index does stay consistently below the long-term 
index, but not always by very much. Consider the yield curve at the present 
moment, i.e., at the time of writing. 
 
CHART 5: Current Municipal Yield Curve26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
        25.   See Bond Buyer Indexes, THE BOND BUYER, 
http://www.bondbuyer.com/apps/custom/msa_search.php?product=bbi_history&col1=1 
&start_date=01%2F03%2F1990&end_date=01%2F03%2F2012&submit=GO (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2017). 
        26.   See Standard & Poor's Intraday Municipal Bond Yield Curves, THE BOND BUYER, 
http://www.bondbuyer.com/marketstatistics/dailycurve/#dataTable (last visited Sept. 22, 
2016). 
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The current yield curve is normal, which indicates that borrowing 
for a shorter time is cheaper than borrowing over a longer period. However, 
the difference in this borrowing rate is not significant by historical 
standards (see Chart 4).27 Still, the difference is real and substantial. ARS 
were financial innovations that took this insight about yields usually being 
lower on shorter-term borrowings one step further.28 The rate for a one-year 
borrowing is still not as good as, say, a twenty-eight day borrowing. Of 
course, borrowing every month would seem to be a big hassle.  
Rather than organize a full-blown borrowing, the banker for the 
issuer would organize a “Dutch” auction. Different lenders would state 
what interest rate they would charge for a twenty-eight-day borrowing and 
how much they would be willing to lend. The bank then awards the 
borrowing to the various bidders based on the “clearing rate.” The clearing 
rate is the rate at which all potential lenders will get their bid rates or better 
with all the debt being purchased.29 
 
TABLE 1: Simplified ARS Dutch Auction30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this simplified example, the clearing rate is 2.5% because, at that 
rate, all available (200) shares are sold to three bidders who all had their 
minimum price met or exceeded. 
One key idea behind ARS is that there were many institutions and 
individuals with lots of money that would be happy to park that money in a 
very short-term municipal security for a little while. Furthermore, this 
system also assumed that the banks that arranged these auctions had plenty 
of cash and could and would step in and invest their own money for a short 
time rather than allow an auction to fail—i.e., have insufficient bidders.31 
                                                 
 27. See id. 
 28. Song Han & Dan Li, Liquidity, Runs, and Security Design (February 15, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344136 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1344136; see generally 
CDIAC supra note 24, at 2. 
 29. Han & Li, supra note 28, at 7. 
 30. For a more involved example, see CDIAC supra note 24. This example omits, 
among other things, what happens when there are current holders of ARS shares who want 
to keep them. 
 31. Han & Li, supra note 28, at 11. 
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The ARS market collapsed in early 2008 when banks stopped supporting 
their auctions, that is, stopped stepping in to provide liquidity when no one 
else would.32 
When the auctions failed, there were several consequences. For the 
investors, the failed auctions meant they could not get their money out.33 
For the issuers, failed auctions triggered their having to pay high maximum 
rates.34 Given the number of deals and their complexities, one cannot say 
that there was one maximum rate or even be sure what the average rate was. 
The most thorough study we are aware of reports that the maximum rate on 
bonds with a fixed maximum rate “mostly concentrate on twelve and fifteen 
percent.”35 Many bonds had floating fixed rates that were lower, while 
some fixed rates were even higher: the Port Authority of New York was 
apparently saddled with a twenty percent maximum rate.36 We should pause 
for a moment to observe how high these rates were relative both to short-
term and long-term rates during the years leading up to the crash. The jump 
in relative short-term rates indicates the budgeting problem that these 
issuers faced. They had budgeted to pay under one percent and now had to 
pay twelve percent.37 The jump in relative long-term rates indicates how 
preferable it would have been just to issue at a long-term rate to begin with. 
 
The following chart is a further illustration of the problem that 
issuers faced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 32. Id. at 7. Whether the banks had made a legal commitment to step in is of course a 
matter of dispute, but there have been large settlements. See also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, supra note 8, at 17; Liu et al., supra note 5, at 6. 
 33. See Han & Li, supra note 28, at 7. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 9-12. 
 36. Id. at 6 n.3; see also Dwight V. Denison & J. Bryan Gibson, A Tale Of Market 
Risk, False Hope, And Corruption: The Impact of Adjustable Rate Debt on the Jefferson 
County, Alabama Sewer Authority, 25 J. OF PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 311 
(2013) (reporting that Jefferson County’s rate rose to ten percent). 
 37. See Han & Li, supra note 28, at 9-12. 
74 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:1: 1 
CHART 6: The Surprising Cost of Auction Rate Securities38 
 
The chart above shows how thirteen years of savings could easily 
be wiped out by one year of failed auctions. Furthermore, because the 
savings accumulate with each successful auction, the amount of risk from a 
failed auction is a moving target. The risk management that would be 
required to hedge and perhaps re-hedge this risk is significant. And, 
because the ARS were supposed to operate like money market instruments, 
the idea of hedging ARS risk was antithetical to what it was perceived to be 
and, therefore, generally not done. 
Faced with failed auctions and high maximum rates, issuers paid 
termination payments and refinanced their ARS using traditional fixed and 
variable rate structures.39 
II. TWO PRINCIPLES IN TENSION 
We have now told the story of ARS, albeit briefly. We now 
consider the story from a broader perspective. It is too easy to dismiss the 
issuing of ARS as simply a bad idea. Using the ARS structure was sensible 
on many grounds, which we will explain below. Of course, the stronger the 
case we make for the use of ARS, the more one might wonder whether it 
was ever a mistake to use them. From our perspective, the question of the 
propriety of ARS represents a clash of principles. The principle inclining to 
the issuance of ARS, preserve public dollars, was applied too aggressively 
                                                 
 38. See Bond Buyer Indexes, supra note 25. 
 39. The full story is, of course, more complicated. See CRAIG L. JOHNSON ET AL., 
STATE AND LOCAL FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 162-64 (2014). 
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relative to an equally important, but under-appreciated, principle: avoid 
asymmetric risk. 
A. Preserve Public Dollars 
Clearly, what happened to the ARS market was unfortunate, but a 
plausible argument can be made that government officials were only doing 
what they were supposed to be doing—namely, trying to save tax dollars. It 
is a deep principle of government financial management that tax dollars are 
a trust and are to be treated with care. This principle is found throughout the 
law. 
For instance, state constitutions generally include a blanket 
prohibition on the gift of public funds.40 Government officials generally 
must submit public projects to bidding.41 Those same officials are also 
barred from having a financial interest in any decision they might make.42 
Various open government laws are, of course, also justified as a means of 
ensuring that the public is able to keep tabs on how its money is spent.43 
There is a more specific application of this principle to sound debt 
management. Advocates of sound municipal debt management have long 
argued—often in vain—that municipalities should be constrained to sell 
their debts competitively.44 It is only by means of a competitive sale that 
governments and taxpayers can be certain that they are getting the best 
possible deal, and this theoretical point about the benefit of competition is 
supported by the majority of research.45 If, therefore, it is best for localities 
to put their debts up for auction at the moment of initial sale, then why was 
                                                 
 40. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (“The Legislature shall have no power . . . to make 
any gift . . . of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other 
corporation . . . .”); see Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State 
Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 909-10 (2003) (for a 
general discussion of these provisions). 
 41. See CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 20162 (2016) (“When the expenditure required for a 
public project exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000), it shall be contracted for and let to the 
lowest responsible bidder after notice.”) (this provision regards cities but similar provisions 
govern other entities). 
 42. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1090(a) (2015) (“Members of the Legislature, state, 
county, district, judicial district, and city officers or employees shall not be financially 
interested in any contract made by them in their official capacity, or by any body or board of 
which they are members. Nor shall state, county, district, judicial district, and city officers or 
employees be purchasers at any sale or vendors at any purchase made by them in their 
official capacity.”). 
 43. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950-63 (2015). 
 44. Bill Simonsen, Competition and Selection in Municipal Bond Sales: Evidence 
from Missouri, 27 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 88 (2007); see also Mark Robbins & Bill 
Simonsen, Missouri Municipal Bonds: The Cost of No Reforms, 36 MUN. FIN. J. 27 (2015). 
 45. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 8, at 17. (“Negotiated offerings appear to 
be more expensive for issuers than competitive offerings both in terms of bond yields and 
underwriter gross spreads.”). 
76 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:1: 1 
it unreasonable to suppose that regular competitive auctions would continue 
to ensure that localities were getting the best deal possible? 
There were even more fine-grained reasons to use ARS. A large 
entity like New York City was, by necessity, already heavily exposed to 
short-term interest rates.46 This is because New York had large financial 
reserves that were invested in very short-term liquid securities. These 
investments did not, of course, yield high interest rates. Why should New 
York not benefit from lower short-term rates by also borrowing at these 
rates? If short-term rates were to increase, then that would be a cost for 
New York as a borrower, but it would be a boon for New York as an 
investor. If the investments and borrowings in short-term securities are 
appropriately balanced, then New York has made its overall financial 
picture more balanced and less risky through the use of ARS. 
Finally, and also weighing in favor of the use of ARS, there is the 
theory of fiscal federalism. This theory has many moving parts, but the key 
part for our purposes is that a federal system will only enjoy the benefits of 
federalism if the component jurisdictions work under hard budget 
constraints.47 To translate: a federal system, by definition, has many lower- 
level jurisdictions. In the U.S. context, there are the states and, within 
states, various kinds of localities. These different subnational jurisdictions 
can, among other things, compete with each other to provide better services 
to their citizens at a better cost.48 Amidst this jurisdictional competition, one 
jurisdiction might hit upon the following strategy if the central government 
is known to bail out improvident subnational governments: impose low 
taxes and provide high services, while borrowing to cover the difference. If 
the strategy works, then perhaps all the new economic activity the 
jurisdiction attracts might allow it to pay off its debt but, if not, the central 
government can be counted on to step in. In order to prevent this moral 
hazard, subnational governments cannot be allowed to overspend and just 
wait for a bailout from the central government. This is what it means for 
lower level governments to be subject to a “hard budget constraint.” 
Hard budget constraints take various typical forms within the 
United States. States and localities often are constrained to balance their 
budgets,49 to go through additional procedures to issue debt,50 and are often 
                                                 
 46. Darcy Bradbury & Frank Oh, Issuers’ Risk Management Using Derivatives and 
Variable-Rate Debt, in THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 37, 37-48 (S. Heide, R. Klein, 
and J. Lederman Eds., 1994). 
 47. See, e.g., Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, in WHEN 
STATES GO BROKE 123 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. ed., 2012); Teresa Ter-
Minassian, Borrowing by Subnational Governments-Issues and Selected International 
Experiences, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, PPAA 96/4 (1996); see also Clayton P. 
Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 
U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 289-90, 316-18 (2012). 
 48. They can also offer different packages of amenities. 
 49. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18; see also Briffault, supra note 40. 
 50. See Briffault, supra note 40. 
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subject to a debt cap.51 Perhaps most importantly, lower level governments 
need to believe that they will not be bailed out by the central government. 
For the American federation, the key moment in this regard came in the 
1840s, when the federal government refused to bail out financially-strapped 
states.52 Indeed, formal rules in state and local law trying to control state 
and local budgets ex ante have followed from the experience of having not 
been bailed out by the central government. 53 
What does the theory of fiscal federalism have to do with ARS? 
The answer is that since localities will suffer for their own poor choices, 
they already have an incentive to issue debt wisely. Thus, there is a way in 
which the ARS story is a happy one from the fiscal federalist perspective. 
Some localities experimented with a financial instrument in order to better 
serve their constituents. The instrument did not work as intended and the 
localities had to pay the price. Lesson learned. 
B. Avoid Asymmetric Risk 
Despite the sensible considerations in favor of localities having the 
power to issue ARS, the consensus—we think—is that the widespread use 
of these securities was not appropriate. Conserving public dollars is not the 
only factor or principle at play here; several other factors are relevant. 
Primarily, there is the matter of risk. After all, a small bet placed in a casino 
could also yield big returns for a government, but outright gambling is 
clearly a violation of the public trust. In short, we think that local 
governments should abide by a principle of avoiding asymmetric risk. This 
principle is less known, but it should not be. 
To illustrate the principle of avoiding asymmetric risk, let’s return 
to the ARS story. Remember that in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis, 
the failure of auctions resulted in some issuers paying interest rates many 
times what they had expected. This clearly imposed a big burden on sound 
budgeting, even assuming that a local government has the funds on hand to 
make the additional payment. And this is before the issuer of a failed ARS 
had to amass even more money to get out of the auction rate security and 
reissue conventional debt. 
In our background discussion, we indicated that, in many cases, 
ARS provides relatively little benefit compared to the assumed risk. This 
was the case in the spectacular failure of Jefferson County, Alabama, which 
used ARS extensively. 
                                                 
 51. Id. 
 52. Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with 
Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW IN FISCAL 
DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 56-61 (Jonathan 
Rodden et al. ed. 2003). 
 53. Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo & John Joseph Wallis, Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal 
Crises, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE 31-32 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. ed. 
2012). 
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CHART 7: Auction Rate Securities and Jefferson County54 
 
 
 
 In order to save a small amount of money on debt service, Jefferson 
County took on the risk that its debt service payments would skyrocket, 
which indeed happened. To be sure, this is an extreme case in some ways 
because of the extent to which Jefferson County had restructured its total 
debt to use ARS.55 However, as we have already seen, the possible jump in 
debt service is not wholly atypical. 
Here is an example from the Chicago Public Schools, which is an 
entity that did not go bankrupt. This chart compares the performance of one 
of Chicago Public Schools’ ARS in comparison to a more traditional, but 
still short-term, variable rate financing. 
 
                                                 
 54. Denison & Gibson, supra note 36, at 334. 
 55. Id. at 325-28. 
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CHART 8: Auction Rate Financings and the Chicago Public Schools56 
 
In this case, we see just how much risk the school system took on 
by issuing an ARS, even relative to a variable rate financing, and how little 
the schools gained during the “good” times. 
We are not the only ones who have observed this skewed risk 
versus reward tradeoff. As the Congressional Research Service put it, 
In effect, ARSs bundled small, albeit not insignificant, 
benefits during normal economic times with serious costs 
in the event of unusual financial turmoil. Thus, the basic 
structure of ARSs incorporated important asymmetric 
risks.57 
An asymmetric risk bundles a large risk with a small reward. This 
bundling does not explain why localities in particular should shun such 
risks even when the risks are likely to save them money. There are at least 
six reasons for local governments in particular not to take on such risks. 
First, local governments are almost always going to be more 
vulnerable to economic shocks outside of their control relative to larger 
                                                 
 56. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 39, at 161. 
 57. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 24. 
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governmental units.58 Thus, the local governments are bearing a great deal 
of risk already. Amplifying the risk is not wise, especially since there could 
well be correlations between locational risk and the risks incorporated into 
these financings.59 
Second, per the fiscal federalism literature, local governments are 
(properly) hemmed in by hard budget constraints.60 They cannot go into the 
marketplace and borrow for operating expenses to handle an unexpected 
expense. 
Third, by definition, capital borrowings are often large relative to a 
government’s operating budget. This means that big changes in annual debt 
service will often amount to significant costs for the entity, its taxpayers, or 
both.61 
Fourth, though it is proper for governments to maintain reserves to 
cope with uncertainties, reserves should not and cannot be so great that 
large amounts of taxpayer dollars are sitting idle.62 Thus, local governments 
cannot sock away large reserve funds in case of surprising changes in 
interest rates. In any event, calculating reserves in case of interest rate shifts 
adds an entirely new level of complexity to budgeting. 
Fifth, asymmetric risks are inherently complicated and thus 
introduce complexity into the budgets of local government entities that will 
often be unlikely to have the expertise to manage the risks.63 
Sixth, governments provide essential services to their 
constituents—services that cannot and ought not be cut for a few months to 
make a higher debt payment. In addition, as recently occurred during the 
Great Recession, it is likely that the demand for government services will 
increase just when tax revenues are down and when riskier debt instruments 
go south. 
III. TWO KINDS OF SOLUTIONS 
Suppose one is convinced that there is a problem here about the use 
of complex financial instruments. It seems to us that there are two basic 
approaches that can be taken. One can argue that the institutional 
intervention required should be on the demand-side. By this, we mean 
                                                 
 58. See, e.g., RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER 39-40 (2016). 
 59. See generally David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Redefining “Tax 
Cuts” and “Tax Hikes”, 98 CAL. L. REV. 749, 784-87 (2010) (arguing that the poor suffer 
most from budget cuts during crises). 
 60. Gillette, supra note 47, at 301. 
 61. Id. at 313. 
 62. See, e.g., Gamage, supra note 59, at 766-67; Brian D. Galle & Kirk Stark, Beyond 
Bailouts: Federal Supports for State Rainy Day Funds, 87 IND. L.J. 599, 611-617 (2012) 
(cataloging some reasons for the failure of states to maintain sufficient reserves). 
 63. See, e.g., Simonsen et al., The Influence of Jurisdiction Size and Sale Type on 
Municipal Bond Interest Rates: An Empirical Analysis, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 709, 709-10 
(2001). 
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interventions that focus on the decision to issue financial instruments. Such 
intervention could be in the form of better disclosure to issuers, better 
education of issuers, or a higher level of responsibility of intermediaries to 
issuers. We have no objection per se to any of these demand-side 
approaches. More education is a good thing, as are the various new federal 
rules that increase the duties of intermediaries to municipal issuers.64 
However, regulation does not work only through the demand-side. 
When a product is sufficiently unsafe, the effective response is not to 
disclose the problem, but to recall the product.65 We think that ARS should 
be subject to recall, a supply solution, and not just additional demand-side 
management. There are two reasons for this. The first reason is the primary 
contribution of this paper, which is to demonstrate that the cost-benefit ratio 
is too skewed. The second reason is that the case of ARS is likely one 
where additional disclosure will be of limited use. 
As to the first reason, we have already listed the many reasons why 
local governments cannot bear asymmetric risks. In short, this is because 
they do not have the expertise, the revenue raising power, or the reserves to 
absorb great shocks. They also have important work to do. 
As for the second reason, supposing that disclosure is going to be a 
magic bullet in this context flies in the face of the great weight of the 
evidence regarding decision-making about complex financial matters. 
Ordinary citizens have a difficult time making complex financial 
decisions66 and do not necessarily appreciate the significance of 
disclosure.67 Furthermore, as the example of ARS indicates, those same 
citizens serving on local governments do not do all that much better. 
CONCLUSION: THE CAMEL’S NOSE OR TAIL? 
One response to our argument could be that ARS are an exceptional 
example as this is a financial instrument so flawed that it has disappeared 
altogether. Therefore, the argument that there should be a categorical rule 
                                                 
 64. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 8; see also Charles W. Cole, Lessons 
From Mars! Were Municipal Auction Rate Securities a Financial Innovation? Conflict of 
Interest, Lack of Transparency, And Agency Costs in the MARS Market, 31 MUN. FIN. J. 77, 
91-92 (2010). 
 65. See generally Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of 
Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 064 (2012). Omarova argues that 
complex financial products should be subject to pre-approval because of the systemic risk 
they pose to the financial system. We are making a similar argument as to complex financial 
products to be used by subnational governments. Rather than aim to limit systemic risk, we 
are arguing that these products should be limited in the municipal context because of 
asymmetric risk. 
 66. See generally Annamaria Lusardi & Peter Tufano, Debt Literacy, Financial 
Experiences and Overindebtedness (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
14808, 2009). 
 67. See, e.g., Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of 
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005). 
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about them is a little too easy. We concede that ARS are an “easy” 
example, but there are other examples that we think, if developed, would all 
be about as “easy.” There are so many financial instruments out there. We 
have already mentioned VRDOs. Another example is interest rate swaps, 
which essentially allow an issuer to move from a short-term rate to a long-
term rate.68 Swaps were often packaged with ARS as a means of reducing 
the interest rate risk resulting from ARS and have also been implicated in 
many high profile disasters, such as Jefferson County and Detroit.69 
There are also capital appreciation bonds. In short, these are bonds 
structured so that payment of the principal is put off, resulting in large 
payments of principal and interest deferred far off into the future. Needless 
to say, the ability to get money for projects now but defer payments for 
later has proven to be very appealing and has saddled many local 
governments with enormous and unnecessary debt burdens.70 
The bestiary of financial instruments can be added to. For instance, 
there are synthetic forward refundings . . . 
All of these financial instruments, like ARS, have legitimate uses. 
The problem is that these uses are limited and require expertise as, in 
fairness, proponents of these structures warned from the start.71 The ARS 
crisis illustrated that many issuers did not have sufficient expertise, which is 
not surprising. Most municipal issuers are small and infrequent and, hence, 
unlikely to have a great deal of in-house financial expertise.72 It is also 
worth noting that even large issuers that surely did have expertise got 
burned in the crisis. For instance, as mentioned above, the Port Authority of 
New York ended up saddled with failed ARS, as did many other large and 
sophisticated issuers. 
                                                 
 68. See Denison & Gibson, supra note 36, at 339-40. 
 69. See generally id. For instance, in Jefferson County. The use of interest rate swaps 
to hedge the interest rate risk posed by ARS illustrates several important points. First, at 
least in theory, additional financial engineering could reduce, even eliminate, the risk posed 
by financial engineering to begin with. Of course, this additional hedging is not costless and 
further reduces the benefit of financial engineering. In theory, if the market is operating 
perfectly, perfect hedging should place the issuer in the same place it would have been just 
issuing a long-term security. Second, it is not likely to be possible for there to be perfect 
hedging. For instance, the ARS crisis resulted in part because there was insufficient 
appreciation of counter-party risk. Third, each additional piece of engineering is expensive 
and yields fees for financial intermediaries, a point we develop in the text. 
 70. L.A. CNTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, CAPITAL APPRECIATION BONDS AND OTHER 
SCHOOL BOND DEBT: CONSEQUENCES OF POOR FINANCIAL PRACTICES 103-04 (2015-2016), 
available at http://www.calboc.org/docs/LACGJ_CAB_Final2015-2016.pdf. Note that one 
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 71. See, e.g., Bradbury & Oh, supra note 46, at 45; Joanne S. Feld, Variable Rate 
Demand Obligations for Issuers of Water and Sewer Debt: An Analytic Framework, 22 
MUN. FIN. J., 1, 25 (Summer 2001); see also Denison & Gibson, supra note 36, at 337, 339 
(lessons from Jefferson County). 
 72. Simonsen et al., supra note 63, at 709-10. 
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The financial intermediaries who are supposed to provide 
governments with expertise73 are inherently conflicted when their business 
models either rely on generating fees from transactions, as they often do, or 
make the fees contingent on the transaction being done, as is also common. 
To some extent, this conflict has always been there. However, it is now 
well-known that the financial sector has grown larger and is in more need 
of fees from transactions than it was before.74 Thus, the conflict has only 
grown. 
Therefore, we think that ARS are an easy example of a larger 
phenomenon, namely intermediaries proposing overly complex and fee-
producing funding structures that save issuers—at best—small amounts of 
money at the expense of taking on asymmetric risk. There is thus a need for 
a regulatory intervention to level the playing field. This intervention should 
guide almost all issuers away from asymmetric risks and toward long-term, 
fixed-rate borrowing. In particular, we think there is a need for a state-level 
debt management authority modeled on the very successful Local 
Government Commission in North Carolina.75 Such a commission should 
establish sensible default rules, such as only using competitive sales and 
generally monitoring local debt issuances for asymmetric risk.76 If the 
federal government is about to give states and localities large incentives to 
borrow for more infrastructure, it should consider how it might prod the 
states to enable their localities to borrow more wisely. Or, if the federal 
government is about to give localities more incentives to borrow less 
wisely, as now seems at least as likely, then it is imperative that the states 
act to protect their localities.77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 73. We should observe that many of the financial intermediaries in these cases likely 
themselves did not understand the risks involved in the products they were selling. 
 74. Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHIC. L. REV. 573, 573-76 (2015). 
 75. One of us (Shanske) discusses the North Carolina case further here: Darien 
Shanske, The (Now Urgent) Case for State-Level Monitoring of Local Government Finances 
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